The Cervera Enigma.
The remains of Admiral Cervera -Medina Sidonia, February 18, 1839-Puerto Real, April 3, 1909- are interred with full honors in the pantheon of illustrious sailors of the Spanish Navy in San Fernando (Cádiz).
This posthumous honor was not the only one received by the admiral who commanded the Spanish fleet in Cuba that was destroyed on July 3, 1898 by the US Navy in the misnamed naval battle of Santiago. Between that date and his death, eleven years later, Cervera received unanimous praise and congratulations in Spain, in addition to some in the U.S., and, after holding several important positions, he was appointed senator for life in the 1903-1904 legislature. Nineteen years after his death, a Spanish Navy cruiser, the leader of its class, was christened in his honor and, already in the midst of the dictatorship, the naming of numerous streets and squares throughout Spain in his name was promoted, especially in coastal towns.
Now, in the 21st century, with greater perspective and better tools, his exalted image is being revised by specialists, both historians and purely military ones. No one questions his integrity, honesty and his firm sense of due discipline, but they do question his complete lack of fighting spirit from the moment he sailed from Spain to Cuba with his fleet, his disastrous approach to the non-battle of Santiago and his rejection of other options proposed by his subordinates who, without forgetting the naval superiority of the Americans, suggested bolder and more creative initiatives to disrupt the enemy blockade. In short, today, scholars of that confrontation are divided into two groups: those who consider it a manifestly improvable strategy and those who believe it could not have been worse.
Things hard to understand.
The admiral’s harangue.
“The solemn moment to plunge into the fight has arrived. The sacred name of Spain and the honor of its glorious flag demand this of us. I wanted you to join me at this rendezvous with the enemy, wearing our dress uniforms. I know this order surprises you, because it is improper in combat, but it is the clothing worn by the sailors of Spain on great solemn occasions, and I do not believe there is a more solemn moment in the life of a soldier than that in which he dies for the Fatherland.
The enemy covets our old and glorious hulls. To this end, he has sent against us all the might of his young squadron. But he will only be able to take the splinters of our ships, and he will only be able to wrest our weapons from us when, already corpses, we float upon these waters, which have been and are Spain’s. My sons! The enemy surpasses us in forces, but does not equal us in valor. Nail the flags to the mast and not a single ship taken prisoner! Crew of my squadron: Long live Spain forever!
Clear for action, and may the Lord receive our souls!”
It is not the patriotic, flamboyant style typical of the era that is striking, although nowadays no political leader, sports coach, and certainly no personal coach would attempt to galvanize their people with a speech so devoid of the slightest hope.
What is striking is the resounding phrase “… our old and glorious hulls…”.
The average age of the Spanish fleet on that day was 4.5 years (counting from the launch date) and that of the American fleet was 4.8 years; it was not the age of the ships that made such an abysmal difference.
The most tragic battle of Santiago de Cuba.
After only an hour and a half of battle, Admiral Sampson sent the following telegram to his president in Washington:
“The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July gift the complete fleet of Cervera”
And much more painful was the human result:
Spain. 350 dead, 550 wounded, 1670 prisoners.
U.S.A. 1 dead and 2 wounded. (it is not a mistake, we repeat: 1 dead and 2 wounded)
And the fact is that it was all a tragic operetta, from the prior decisions not to conduct gunnery practice, to locking themselves in the sack of Santiago, the entire fleet bottled up by itself, the exit in daylight of the ships one by one and so far apart from each other that the difficult thing for the Americans was to miss the targets.
The exception: Fernando Villaamil.
Captain Fernando Villaamil, who was 53 years old when he commanded the brand new and novel flotilla of three destroyers that was part of the squadron of Admiral Cervera that arrived in Cuba in 1898 with the most misguided mission a fleet could receive.
By way of comparison, Fernando Villaamil was the most high-profile senior command at the national and international level, more so than Cervera, that the Spanish navy had in that period.
On the national level, he was so because in 1892, the fourth centenary of Columbus’s first voyage, he commanded the corvette Nautilus with which he circumnavigated the world and, let us remember, the Panama Canal was then only a project of dubious completion.
And on the international level, because the best war fleets in the world copied his design and concept of the new ships first called torpedo boat catchers and later destroyers, which were produced in English shipyards with the indications and improvements applied by Villaamil.
Captain Villaamil had opposed the Spanish squadron locking itself in the port of Santiago to avoid a frontal encounter with the American fleet, which, as was finally seen, was a disastrous decision.
Also, together with Captain Joaquín Bustamante, they proposed alternative courses of action to try to divide the enemy fleet, have opportunities for some success, and save ships. All their proposals were rejected by Cervera.
Fernando Villamil was the only high-ranking command who died fighting and disappeared with his ship the destroyer Furor. His body was never recovered.
The USS Gloucester of Captain Wainwright
This yacht converted into a warship just months before the confrontation took the initiative to engage the Spanish torpedo boats Furor and Plutón, which were better armed and faster, but with hardly any gunnery practice (lack of budget, it was said) and combat tactics. The complete opposite of the USS Gloucester, whose artillery precision made it unstoppable.
Once the Furor was sunk and the Plutón was run aground, it effectively dedicated itself to rescuing Spanish survivors, Admiral Cervera among them.
The great success of the Gloucester is attributed to the intense prior preparation that Wainwright forced his gunners and other crew members to undertake. It was the audacity of the one who is well prepared versus the brave patriot who has not done the slightest preparation worthy of the name.
Víctor Rubio
P.S.
LIGHT ON THE WAR OF 1898: Unpublished and proscribed manuscript by Ramón Auñón, Minister of the Navy in 1898
Preserved for 130 years, the manuscript of the Minister of the Navy at the time is becoming the plausible explanation for the defeat at Santiago. We will return to the topic.
