INSTEAD of a /no vote on the Net-Zero Framework, the IMO now has five big green policy options before it.
The NZF as is, and its two close cousins — one slightly laxer (by Brazil) and the other much harsher (by Tuvalu) — are fine for progressives, but unacceptable to the US and petrostates.
Conversely, Liberia’s plan for a no-tax, low-ambition alternative works for the US and the Saudis, but it has no chance of passing muster with the likes of the EU27, Canada and the Pacific Islands because it wouldn’t cut emissions by nearly enough.
That makes latecomer Japan’s fifth proposal worth looking at in depth.
The plan is pitched as a compromise: no Net-Zero Fund or mandatory carbon penalty, and easier climate targets out to 2040.
There is also the option of voluntary compliance payments by shipowners to good causes, ostensibly to fund green fuels and a “just and equitable transition”.
On paper, Japan has pulled off an artful bit of diplomacy; coming up with something that can satisfy two seemingly incompatible political goals is a tough job.
Shipowners will like the idea of keeping their compliance funds. No more mention of “net zero” could satisfy conservatives.
But in reality, the plan is far closer to Liberia’s, and introduces similar added complexity and climate risk, while denying green fuel producers the certainty of a market they need.
The IMO Secretariat has a strong incentive to adopt something to stop its GHG talks falling apart, however flawed. Will it try to promote Japan’s plan as a landing zone? And where will that leave green shipping?
Declan Bush
Senior reporter, Lloyd’s List
