Transhipment of Russian oil in the Gulf of Oman area on the rise
Regulatory scrutiny encourages sanctions evaders to develop more advanced deceptive practices
Spoofing that more closely resembles normal sailing movements used
Manipulation of AIS data is evolving, further complicating efforts to track sanctions-skirting tankers
RUSSIA’S shadow fleet tankers are using sophisticated spoofing methods to disguise ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman to circumvent sanctions and avoid detection by watchful regulators.
Analysts at energy intelligence provider Vortexa first spotted the transhipment of Russian oil in this area in February 2024.
At the time it was an infrequent occurrence, but this activity is on the rise and becoming more difficult to spot as tankers manipulate their positional data in increasingly sophisticated ways to avoid detection.
Vortexa senior freight analyst Mary Melton said STS transfers in the Gulf of Oman enabled the transfer of Russian crude from a US Office of Foreign Assets Control-designated tanker to a non-Ofac-sanctioned tanker, which could then deliver the cargo to India or China.
“Logistically, it also enables the sanctioned tankers to conduct the STS in a location further away from the ultimate discharge port and head back to Russia to load more quickly,” Melton said.
Aframax Rozmarine (IMO: 9250531), for example, departed the port of Murmansk on January 28, two weeks after it was sanctioned by Ofac, laden with 738,000 barrels of Novy Port crude.
It entered the Gulf of Aden on February 18 and started manipulating its positional information within days.
At this point the Automatic Identification System trace, which showed the vessel taking a seemingly normal route up to the Gulf of Oman before turning back, is falsified.
Rozmarine conducted a STS transfer with Sierra Leone-flagged Prisma (IMO: 9299678) during this period, according to Vortexa.
Prisma also spoofed its location at this time, showing itself as manoeuvring off the southern coast of Oman, near Duqm.
The cargo was delivered by Prisma to Lanshan, China at the end of March.
SynMax Intelligence, a US intelligence company, identified another event following the same modus operandi.
Suezmax Canara (IMO: 9411331), sanctioned by Ofac in early January, loaded in the arctic port of Murmansk from April 30 to May 2.
The ship then sailed via the Red Sea route to the Gulf of Aden indicating its destination as “China for order”.
Canara disabled its AIS data on 29 May while off the coast of Oman. It was offline for just over 16 days.
SynMax Intelligence tracked Canara conducting a STS transfer with Vernal (IMO: 9207027) between June 13 and 14 in the Gulf of Oman, north of Muscat.
Vernal was manipulating its AIS data over this period.
The cargo was discharged in India.
Vernal and Prisma were sanctioned by the EU on July 20 but neither have been designated by Ofac.
The evolution of deceptive shipping practices in this area is down to the continuous monitoring by Washington of illicit trading activities, said Signal analyst Maria Bertzeletou.
“The US has been imposing successive rounds of sanctions to drive such trade toward zero and reinforce the effectiveness of its sanctions regime.”
The enhanced scrutiny requires those engaging in sanctioned oil trades to be more inventive to evade detection, creating additional challenges for those trying to track this activity, particularly for businesses attempting to limit their exposure to potentially risky trade.
“Sophisticated spoofing can appear completely normal, even to the trained eye, making it a significant challenge for risk and compliance professionals to detect,” said a SynMax Intelligence analyst.
The Gulf of Oman is key hub for the movement of sanctioned oil, mainly Iranian crude.
At the time of writing there are 142 shadow* fleet tankers in the area. Many of these vessels are spoofing their AIS to appear in certain locations within the Gulf of Oman. In reality, they are either conducting dark STS transfers nearby or loading in an Iranian port.
