As reported by Bloomberg and the advocacy group United Against a Nuclear Iran, Malaysia has recently scaled back its crude oil exports to China amid rising scrutiny. Interestingly, Iranian crude is still making its way to Chinese markets through alternative routes.
In 2024, Malaysia’s crude oil shipments to China surged to approximately 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd), a significant jump compared to previous years. However, domestic production from regions like Sabah and Sarawak only accounts for about 500,000 bpd. This discrepancy suggests that Iranian oil is being misrepresented as Malaysian during ship-to-ship transfers in international waters near Johore—a situation underscored by the explosion of the tanker Pablo in 2023.
Following these revelations, Malaysian exports of crude oil to China plummeted over 30% between July and August as authorities uncovered more instances of cargo mislabeling.
Despite this decline in official exports, ship-to-ship transfers off Johore have persisted unabated. In fact, Indonesian oil shipments to China have seen a remarkable increase; Bloomberg reports that these exports rose from an average of 580,000 bpd earlier this year to around 630,000 bpd in August—despite most Indonesian production being consumed domestically.
The report indicates that Indonesian crude destined for Chinese ports such as Qingdao and Dalian was allegedly loaded at Kabil near Singapore. Notable vessels involved include VLCCs like the /Baltic Commander I, Pola, and /Thea.
The VLCC /Afra Willow has reportedly made multiple trips from Kabil since mid-August (VesselFinder / Cengiz Tokgoz)
However, Kabil’s loading facilities are primarily designed for LPG handling with limitations on vessel size—only accommodating tankers up to 35,000 dwt with drafts not exceeding 10.5 meters. The four VLCCs mentioned are too large even for anchorage nearby; satellite imagery confirms their absence at the port—raising suspicions about the legitimacy of claims regarding Indonesian cargo origins.
The proximity of Indonesian terminals relative to ship-to-ship transfer zones east of Johore (/Google /CJRC)
Indonesia does export some crude from its Duri field via Dumai port using larger tankers capable of carrying up to 150,000 dwt with drafts reaching up to 17.7 meters; however, shipping patterns have remained relatively stable over the past year.
This raises concerns about potential forgery surrounding documents used for converting Iranian oil into what’s claimed as Indonesian supply. While Pertamina has faced corruption issues previously—and while there’s no evidence suggesting official complicity—it appears fraudulent bills may be generated without their knowledge.
The expectation is that scrutiny will intensify on these fraudulent documents leading authorities toward closing loopholes soon enough; however it’s likely Iran will simply find new deceptive loading points while continuing operations until those too are shut down within months’ timeframes.
Similarly Chinese ports identified receiving illicitly sourced oils have begun restricting future deliveries which may just shift them towards nearby unmonitored docks instead.
Official statistics claim zero imports from Iran yet external analysts estimate around1.45 million bpd were received during early months into2025—a slight uptick compared year-on-year figures!
Clever maneuvering by those circumventing sanctions often outpaces government efforts resulting in continued flows: estimates suggest roughly eighty percent remains accessible despite Tehran exporting heavily discounted volumes totaling around1.6 million barrels daily unless intercepted en route causing financial repercussions deterring further transactions altogether!
Iranian export figures based on analysis conducted by Kpler & Vortexa (CJRC) em> p >
