The US Navy is halting the Constellation-class construction program and realigning its fleet planning. The decision has security policy implications – it stands for the strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific, opens up a maritime responsibility gap for Europe and also has consequences for a German supplier.
The US Navy has decided to cancel its Constellation-class frigate construction program. The reasons are complex, with ongoing delays and cost increases being communicated to the outside world. The construction of further ships beyond the first two units has been discontinued. The naval leadership speaks of a strategic change of course, while Congress warns of security policy consequences.
The Constellation class was designed as a multi-purpose frigate to replace the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and take on a variety of tasks (escort, submarine hunting, air defense). Its design was based on the Italian FREMM frigate and was adapted to the requirements of the US Navy. In 2020, Fincantieri Marinette Marine was awarded the contract to build the series of up to 20 ships originally planned.
Fast(er) boats instead of capital ships
In the US Navy’s official announcement on the programme stop, which was taken up by Defence-Industry Europe and others, the US Navy speaks of a “strategic change” in which ship types that can be built significantly faster than the complex Constellation frigate are to be prioritized in the future. A high-ranking representative quoted explained that the discontinuation of the remaining units would give the Navy “the flexibility to realign shipyard capacity and move towards future projects – rather than committing to a single, highly complex large ship for years”.
At the same time, the US Navy wants to retain Fincantieri Marinette Marine as a proven industrial partner. Now with the aim of building “small surface combatants, manned and unmanned” in the future – i.e. smaller and more modular platforms that meet the desire for rapid and serial construction. Bloomberg also reports that a central motive was to redirect resources in order to realize a fleet “faster, more efficiently and in larger numbers”.
Problems and reasons for the end: management and program errors in the development process
Difficulties arose early on. The Navy began construction before the design was fully completed. As a result, the type ship increased in weight by over 10% and its completion was delayed by three years to 2029.
By April 2025, only around 10% of the work had been completed, while the cost of the first unit had grown to around 1.5 billion US dollars. At the start of construction, the cost of the first unit was estimated at 1.281 billion US dollars, construction number 2 was expected to cost 1.053 billion US dollars, and construction numbers 3 and 4 around 1.09 billion US dollars each. The difference between the first and the other units is due to the fact that the US Navy includes the development costs in the first units in the US budget system. The differences from construction number 2 onwards can be explained by the general price trend. The equipment shares are included in the budget figures.
In 2024 and 2025, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) criticized management errors such as embellished progress reports and premature orders despite unfinished designs.
Design maturity problems, change inflation and lack of configuration discipline ultimately led to costly rework, construction stoppages and further schedule delays and rising costs.
Reactions from the Navy and Congress
Navy Secretary John Phelan presented the end of the program as part of a “strategic change of course”. New ship types are to be developed more quickly in order to focus the US Navy more specifically on current threats. The Navy wants to redirect the freed-up funds into platforms that can be built more quickly – such as smaller amphibious ships or unmanned boats – in order to put more units into service more quickly.
In Congress, Senator Tammy Baldwin criticized the end as a “blow to our national security” and warned that it would give China a head start. Representative Tony Wied, on the other hand, showed understanding and urged replacement orders in order to maintain shipyard capacities in the country.
Strategic consequences – an initial outlook: Europe
The discontinuation of the Constellation class poses challenges for the US Navy. The ships were intended as a key component in the expansion of the fleet. The aim was to address the growing quantitative lead of the Chinese navy. Between 2022 and 2025, new larger surface units – destroyers, modern frigates, large amphibious carriers and individual large combat ships such as Type 055s or aircraft carriers – were delivered to the PLAN in the high single-digit to low double-digit range each year. Depending on the method of counting and the year, the estimates of serious analyses range from roughly 5 to 12 large combat ships per year, plus additional corvettes, smaller units and auxiliary ships. So far with the aim of establishing regional superiority and dominating in a possible conflict over Taiwan
In contrast to the PLAN, which can concentrate its forces on this clear regional focus, the US Navy must maintain a global presence and alliance commitments – and thus spread its combat power over many areas. By deciding against the Constellation class, Washington is opting for a navy with simpler and faster-to-build units and autonomous systems to rapidly deploy platforms. The focus is on mass, availability and technological superiority.
Europe, cave! – The strategic price of the US focus on the Pacific
The decision also has a decisive geopolitical dimension for the Europeans. If the US Navy’s ability to maintain an effective presence in several maritime areas at the same time – securing sea lanes, supporting allies, demonstrating presence and deterring opponents – decreases, the probability increases that the US Navy will have to pool its forces in the event of a crisis. According to emerging interpretations, the Indo-Pacific is the focus. For Europe, this means an increased responsibility gap in maritime defense and deterrence – especially in the North Atlantic, the Arctic and the Mediterranean.
Industrial policy implications
The decision has direct consequences for the maritime industry. Rolls-Royce mtu was to supply four 20V 4000 M53B diesel-electric generators for the Constellation class; the order had been awarded in 2021 and confirmed in 2023. The discontinuation means the planned series requirement no longer applies.
For Fincantieri Marinette Marine, the stop means a significant loss of orders: the shipyard is losing four firmly planned newbuildings; only two units will be completed.
The US Navy has announced that it will prioritize alternative projects – including amphibious transport ships and icebreakers – in order to secure capacity and employment.
Further classification: speed and quantities
If the cancellation of the Constellation program shows a willingness to learn from mistakes, it also reveals fundamental shortcomings in maritime armaments planning. It was not the design itself that was flawed, but its over-complex adaptation and lack of implementation control that turned it into a procurement debacle.
The discontinuation of the Constellation class fits into a general shift away from classic long-term, large-scale projects and towards more quickly realizable, flexible platforms – often simpler, smaller and possibly faster to build, such as amphibious, support or unmanned ships.
On November 7, 2025, Hegseth presented a comprehensive reform of the procurement processes to representatives of the defense industry and Pentagon acquisition managers. According to an internal draft of the memo “Transforming the Warfighting Acquisition System to Accelerate Fielding of Capabilities”, the focus should be consistently on “speed to delivery” in future: Speed, less bureaucracy, greater flexibility and /competitive logic instead of lengthy, cumbersome planning and approval processes.
The fact that the ambitious frigate programme, of all things, was cancelled, even though it was seen as the fixed star of fleet modernization, is widely regarded as a deliberate signal: the new priority is speed, cost and time discipline, flexibility. By Hans Uwe Mergener
