Editor’s Note: On April 17, Eastern Time, the Office of the United States Trade Representative announced the final measures for the Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. Among them, the measure to impose port fees on relevant Chinese vessels will be officially implemented on October 14.
On October 10, China announced “legitimate defense” countermeasures, deciding to impose special port dues on US vessels starting from the 14th.
The author, Zuo Qianhu, an expert in the field of international logistics, in response to the US Section 301 Act, pointed out in his article that China’s shipping industry needs to technically collaborate with carriers to optimize routes and build transshipment hubs to cope with discriminatory policies, and strategically link with US multinational corporations to form a counterbalancing force. The Chinese government should promote the localization of freight payment and enhance the discourse power and rule-making power in international shipping through regulation and policy guidance. This multi-level game of government-enterprise coordination is a necessary path for China to build an autonomous supply chain system.
On April 17, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released the final findings and implementation details of the Section 301 investigation targeting China’s shipping, logistics, and shipbuilding industries, clearly setting a 180-day buffer period, with fees officially levied starting October 14, 2025. This policy is clearly discriminatory and targeted, will directly impact China’s shipping industry, and the industry needs to quickly initiate a systematic response.
From the perspective of policy implementation certainty, the shipping industry needs to maintain a clear understanding. During the buffer period, the Sino-US tariff war was temporarily suspended twice on May 12 and August 12. The policy volatility of the Trump administration on tariff issues has led some industries to doubt the implementation of the Section 301 Act fee measures, but if the shipping industry holds a similar view, it shows a lack of understanding.
Looking at the operational patterns of the Trans-Pacific route and the Sino-US trade structure, the total bilateral trade volume between China and the US in 2024 was $688.28 billion (China’s exports to the US were $524.656 billion, imports from the US were $163.624 billion). However, the vast majority of Trans-Pacific route shipping costs are paid by US shippers locally in the US: during the same period, sales of Chinese enterprises in the US were $78.64 billion, while sales of US enterprises in China reached $490.52 billion. The trade pattern and profit distribution dominance significantly tilt towards the US side.
From the perspective of interest logic, this Section 301 Act is fundamentally different from the tariff war. Its core demand is for the US shipbuilding industry (whose scale continues to shrink) to use policy tools to compete for interests in the international shipping industry.
The main force of the international shipping industry is foreign carriers. The scale of the US domestic shipping industry is small, and its political representation ability is weak. Previous acts such as the “Ocean Shipping Reform Act” and the “American Ship Act” have confirmed that this industry is in a weak position in policy games. Therefore, it is judged that the implementation of the Section 301 Act has little uncertainty, and the industry must be fully prepared to respond.
From a macro perspective, the Section 301 Act has dual attributes: “the struggle for interests between US interest groups and the international shipping industry” and “the game for world economic dominance between China and the US.”
The design of the Section 301 Act presents two major characteristics: first, imposing universal fees on carriers in the global shipping industry; second, adopting targeted differential fees against Chinese shipping carriers. The impact of this policy direction on China’s shipping industry needs to be addressed at the strategic level.
Replacing “Passive Avoidance” with “Active Response”
In the container liner shipping sector, the US Section 301 Act poses a significant impact on Chinese shipping companies. This requires Chinese shipping companies to completely abandon the habitual thinking of “passively avoiding risks” when facing trade barriers and transform into a unified attitude of “active response” at the strategic level, clearly defining the dual boundaries of commercial interests and industry responsibility. Only by actively breaking the situation can they avoid falling into the predicament of “passively adjusting routes and passively bearing costs.”
For Chinese shipping companies, the choice of “active response” rather than “passive avoidance” this time has key strategic value. If they still rely on passive avoidance, it will not only be difficult to break through external policy barriers but also miss the opportunity to accumulate international game experience and advance towards world-class shipping power. Active response is not only the necessary path to break through barriers but also the core test for competing for shipping rule-making power and consolidating China’s position as a supply chain hub in the future process of restructuring the global economic system.
At the industry operation level, the author suggests that Chinese shipping companies can take the lead in linking with other carriers to carry out collaborative cooperation around route network optimization and dynamic capacity allocation. By integrating industry resources and coordinating operational rhythms, they can not only enhance the risk resistance capability of individual enterprises but also form a joint response force at the industry level, laying a practical foundation for subsequent deeper strategy implementation.
Specifically, transshipment hubs can be established in foreign ports close to the US. For example, changing the US Northwest route to first call at the Port of Vancouver, using large Chinese-built mainline mother ships for the segment from Chinese coastal ports to Vancouver, and then using non-Chinese-built feeder small ships for the short-distance shuttle from Vancouver to US Northwest ports like Seattle.
Meanwhile, Chinese shipping companies can proactively take on more responsibility for investing in transshipment port infrastructure and deploying mainline mother ships, leveraging China’s advantages in infrastructure to renovate and expand potential ports. For example, on the South America to US route, the newly built Port of Chancay can be used as a regional transshipment hub to enhance its throughput and international status.
From the perspective of fee impact, the Section 301 Act will increase the per-container cost on the US West Coast and US East Coast routes. By establishing transshipment ports, Chinese shipping companies can readjust container slots during /reloading at the transshipment port, and select smaller feeder ship types more suitable for the water depth conditions of various US ports, thereby improving overall operational efficiency, reducing per-container costs, and partially offsetting the additional costs brought by the Section 301 Act.
Furthermore, Chinese shipping companies should accelerate the upgrading of their fleet structure, such as ordering ships that adopt advanced green methanol dual-fuel technology to cope with new environmental regulations and enhance competitiveness. At the same time, they should strengthen their global terminal layout, reinforce the advantages of port-shipping coordination, accelerate the intelligent, digital, and green transformation of ports, and enhance the service level of key hub ports.
However, technical adjustments at the industry level can only temporarily mitigate losses. To fundamentally solve the problem, it is necessary to deeply analyze the interest structure behind the Act. After the implementation of the Section 301 Act, the direct beneficiaries are the Trump administration and the US shipbuilding industry, the direct losers are non-US major carriers, and the indirect losers are US multinational corporations.
Based on this, the author suggests that Chinese shipping companies can form a community of interests with other carriers and jointly partner with US multinational enterprises, leveraging their domestic political lobbying power in the US to collectively pressure the government.
