The sanctioned global fleet currently amounts to 1,387 vessels, dominated by 1,004 tanker vessels comprising 72% of the total and with an average age of 20.4 years, according to the latest commentary from Xclusiv Shipbrokers.
Following this are gas carriers and general cargo vessels with 65 and 206 units, respectively, while container ships and bulk carriers make up the remainder.
The age profile remains markedly old, with a high-risk segment, long detached from conventional commercial standards.
The vessels operate -largely- outside regulated frameworks of insurance, inspections, and classification, on routes linked mainly to Russia, Iran, and Venezuela.
Within the crude oil transport segment, the composition of sanctioned units reveals the profound impact these operations have had on the global tonnage balance. The LR2s lead the list with 320 vessels, equivalent to 26.8% of the active fleet in that category (the highest proportion among all groups).
They are followed by Suezmax at 17.1% and VLCCs at 16.1%, while MR1, MR2, and LR1 exhibit smaller but relevant shares, between 6% and 13%. Collectively, the restricted vessels represent 12.8% of the total operational fleet, which amounts to 7,820 vessels.
Regarding age, the distribution is heavily skewed towards long-lived vessels: 335 units are between 17 and 20 years old, and another 494 are over two decades old, meaning that nearly 82% of the sanctioned vessels belong to an aging generation.
This pattern reveals a structural imbalance. Only 175 vessels are 16 years old or less, compared to 829 that are over 17. In contrast, the active fleet has 4,814 newer units and 3,006 older ones. Thus, the sanctioned vessels represent only 3.6% of the young segment, but a significant 27.6% among the oldest ones (an increase from the previous 26.1%).
The concentration is even more pronounced among large oil carriers: in vessels over 17 years old, the restricted tonnage represents 60.6% of LR2s, 51.5% of Suezmax, and 47% of VLCCs, demonstrating how the aged extreme of the market is dominated by non-standard units.
This imbalance far exceeds the renewal capacity, given that the order book-to-fleet ratio remains around 15.6%, which offers a limited replacement margin, as highlighted by Xclusiv Shipbrokers.
This fleet acts as a hidden buffer that, when withdrawn or rendered inactive, cannot be quickly replaced by new capacity. Flag registries reinforce the system’s opacity. Russia, Comoros, and Sierra Leone account for over a quarter of the sanctioned tankers, followed by Iran, Oman, and Panama. Also featured are North Korea, Palau, and Tanzania (Zanzibar), along with a long list of minor registries ranging from Gambia to Vanuatu.
This clustering in permissive jurisdictions reflects deliberate strategies to evade regulatory controls and makes tracing the real ownership difficult, highlighting the institutional fragility of this parallel ecosystem.
Should the sanctions be lifted, the return of this fleet to legitimate trade would be complex.
Most units over 17 years old would face significant obstacles in obtaining contracts, insurance, or recovering their classification.
Prolonged operation outside regulated maintenance cycles, unclear dry-dock records, and lax flag state oversight have likely deteriorated both the technical condition and safety standards.
Many vessels would go directly to being inactive or being scrapped, reducing effective capacity just as sanctioned cargo volumes return to regulated trade. In that scenario, the global supply of tankers would tighten while demand for transport increases, a structural setup that would favor rising rates and asset revaluation.
