Dryad Global in its “Shadow Fleet Exposed by Sanctions and Sensors” report highlights how western sanctions, satellite surveillance and advanced analytics are steadily shrinking the operating space for shadow fleet vessels.
According to the report, Russia’s slice of this underground market has grown from fewer than 100 tankers in early 2022 to somewhere between 300 and 600 by early 2025, depending on the counting method. Roughly 40 percent of those hulls came from EU sellers, owners of offloading vessels near or beyond their mid-life survey.
Age is the hidden hazard. Through constant flag-hopping, name changes and shell company swaps, many shadow-fleet tankers present fresh paperwork while hiding their build year and maintenance record.
According to Anna Giacomello, Analyst, Dryad Global, unless a counterparty runs a deep hull history search (matching every prior IMO number), the vessel can look serviceable when, in fact, its steel is two-plus decades old and classification may have lapsed. The typical Russian shadow-fleet tanker is 20–25 years old, well above the global crude-tanker average of 13 years.
The term “shadow fleet” refers to vessels that obscure their movements and identities – disabling AIS, frequently changing flags, concealing ownership structures, and operating under minimal insurance coverage – to transport sanctioned cargo.
Between January and May 2025, the U.S., EU, and U.K. imposed coordinated sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet, blacklisting around 270 distinct tankers linked to Russian crude. The crackdown began on 10 January, when the U.S. Treasury added 183 tankers and sanctioned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, removing 17 million DWT from mainstream trade.
The EU’s 16ᵗʰ and 17ᵗʰ sanctions packages (in February and May) added 74 and 189 tankers respectively, introduced liability for facilitating unsafe or uninsured tankers, and expanded the EU blacklist to 153 vessels. The U.K. followed in March, adding 29 more hulls.
After removing duplicates, the combined western sanctions now cover about 270 tankers, nearly 25 million DWT, triple the number listed in January.
Dryad Global highlights how tankers operating in the shadow fleet rely on a consistent set of evasion techniques to avoid scrutiny and circumvent sanctions.
The first tactic is AIS manipulation. Crews may change the vessel’s self-reported type from “oil tanker” to a less regulated category, or disable the transponder entirely while transiting sensitive choke points such as Ceuta or the Strait of Hormuz—reactivating it only once offshore. In some cases, vessels transmit false static positions, showing themselves as anchored while actually underway toward a mid-sea transfer point.
Frequent changes to a ship’s name and flag are also common. A tanker might switch from a Russian to a Liberian registry within days, often repainting identifiers while in port. These changes are quickly reflected in digital certificates, which are typically accepted at face value by port-state authorities.
Ownership structures are equally fluid. A single vessel may be passed between multiple front companies over the course of a year—often registered in jurisdictions such as the Seychelles, Sharjah, or the Marshall Islands. These transactions are usually recorded at nominal prices, obscuring the identity of the beneficial owner behind layers of nominee directors.
Cargo concealment is the final step. Offshore transfers near Lomé, Ceuta, or Kandla often blend Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan crude into mixed cargoes labelled as generic fuel oil. This makes origin tracing difficult and hampers the enforcement of sanctions and price caps.
Because these tactics are often combined—AIS spoofing, flag and name changes, shell ownership, and blended cargo—regulators increasingly treat any vessel with rapidly shifting identifiers as high risk. Enforcement has shifted from individual inspections to broader vessel blacklists based on behavioral patterns.
