If this were not read by experts in foreign trade or international relations, and only dissected by gray heads of common sense, the conjunction of the terms “trade agreement” between the United States and Argentina would quickly evoke a scene where both give and receive, where equitable reciprocity is a supporting actor and convenience and urgency are the exclusive protagonists.
Last November 13, the United States and Argentina announced the signing of the framework understanding “Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment”, which establishes the basis for a future bilateral treaty.
This agreement, according to the White House, follows the “historic triumphs” of President Trump’s recent trip to Asia and is part of the “America First Trade Policy”.
First Impressions
The Argentine Exporters Chamber (CERA), in its swift analysis, pointed out that while the declaration is a very significant step forward, it is a joint declaration that requires the finalization of a formal text and its subsequent parliamentary approval.
CERA warns, for example, that the framework terms do not yet allow for a full understanding of the implications regarding Mercosur and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) criteria to which Argentina is obligated by the WTO.
Future Projection
According to Laura Bacigalupo, a legal specialist in foreign trade at the Bruchou & Funes de Rioja firm, “the agreement foresees the opening of new opportunities for US exporters in a modernized Argentine market, with better access conditions. For investors, it proposes a more predictable framework and clear rules that favor bilateral investment. Consumers and workers in both countries could benefit from greater economic dynamism, although changes are anticipated that will require careful management.”
The expert highlighted the outstanding points of the framework agreement. For example, Argentina commits to granting preferential access to US goods, including certain medicines, chemicals, machinery, information technologies, medical devices, motor vehicles, and agricultural products. For its part, the US will eliminate certain tariffs on natural resources and pharmaceutical articles, conditional on Argentina meeting supply chain and economic security requirements.
Concessions
“The agreement would also contemplate the elimination of non-tariff barriers, such as import licenses, and the simplification of procedures for US products. Regarding standards and certifications, Argentina will accept goods that comply with US or international standards without requiring additional conformity assessments,” she added.
In terms of intellectual property protection and agricultural access, Argentina commits to “strengthen the protection of intellectual property, aligning its patent and geographical indication standards with international standards” while promoting the fight against counterfeit products, both physical and digital, and will work on the “simplification of registrations for US meat and dairy products to the Argentine market.”
“The agreement would reaffirm Argentina’s commitment to the protection of internationally recognized labor rights and the prohibition of importing goods produced with forced labor.
Likewise, sustainable practices in forestry and the efficient use of resources will be promoted,” Bacigalupo expanded.
Special Attention
“While this declaration represents a significant advance in the bilateral relationship -continued the specialist- sensitive sectors like agriculture, automobiles, and critical minerals will require special attention in the upcoming stages of negotiation. The development and implementation of the final text will be crucial to materialize the expected benefits and consolidate a strategic cooperation between both countries”.
In its analysis, the Exporters’ Chamber warns that the declaration comes at a time when Washington is using trade as a tool of hard power and Buenos Aires is seeking to anchor its external strategy to some kind of geopolitical “prize”.
The Imbalance
According to the entity, when reading the letter, the concrete concessions appear almost entirely on one side. They indicate it is a sort of “antechamber” where they commit to “work expeditiously” to finalize the text and then submit it to their internal procedures, including parliamentary approval. .
The problem, they say, appears when one looks at the commitments already undertaken and, above all, the degree of asymmetry between what is specified for Argentina and what remains open, conditional, or directly unspecified in the case of the United States.
Country by Country, Case by Case
Since the start of Trump’s second term, the so-called “America First Trade Policy” has been expressed through a battery of tariff and para-tariff measures: from tariffs linked to the fentanyl crisis, Section 232 on national security, the “Liberation Day” tariffs, Section 301 investigations, to the end of the de minimis exemption for small shipments.
Against this backdrop, the White House has been closing bilateral understandings with the United Kingdom, the EU, several Asian countries, and, more recently, with Latin American economies like El Salvador, Ecuador, and Guatemala. Argentina fits into this wave as part of a package of “historic agreements with partners in the Western Hemisphere”.
The message is that access to the North American market is negotiated country by country, under Washington’s rules, and with counterparts that go far beyond the commercial sphere.
Two Magnifying Glasses
According to the CERA, this text establishes that Argentina “will grant preferential access” to exports of goods from the United States, including pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery, ICT, medical devices, motor vehicles, and a wide range of agricultural products.
And it focuses on two problems:
American Recognition
On the American side, the text announces that “in recognition” of Argentina’s reform agenda and its alignment on economic security and supply chains, reciprocal tariffs on “certain unavailable natural resources” and non-patented pharmaceutical-use products will be eliminated. The list of affected Argentine goods is not yet known, so the real impact is only projectable.
Something similar occurs with the Section 232 measures: Washington “may positively consider” the effect of the agreement when adopting trade measures within that framework.
Today, that section applies 50% tariffs on steel, aluminum and derivatives, 25% on cars and auto parts, 10% on lumber, 25% on wooden furniture, among others.
“May consider”, at this point in the semantics, is not the same as “will reduce” or “will eliminate”. It is a margin of discretion, not an obligation, which will impose discipline in the negotiation.
Detailed commitment
Then, in the area of non-tariff barriers, the imbalance is more pronounced since Argentina commits to:
Furthermore, it accepts the importation of products that comply with United States norms, technical regulations or conformity assessment procedures or international standards, without additional requirements, including vehicles, medical devices and pharmaceutical products. In practice, this is a broad recognition of the US regulatory framework as sufficient. No explicit reciprocity is perceived a priori.
No mention
On the Argentine side, on the other hand, there is not a single mention of the review of anti-dumping measures (honey, grape must), tariff-rate quotas (beef, peanuts, sugar) or sanitary restrictions that affect exports to the US.
An additional gesture: Argentina commits to eliminating consular formalities for US exports and to gradually dismantle the statistical fee on those products.
The CERA analysis also covers cooperation to “facilitate investment and trade in critical minerals”. However, this is not a specific agreement like those already signed by the United States with Australia, Malaysia or Thailand. It is one more item on a menu of intentions. It is not yet a concrete preferential framework.
In a context where the lithium triangle and other minerals have become hard currency in geopolitics, remaining only at the declaration level somewhat weakens Argentina’s negotiating capacity. Nevertheless, perhaps the will to agree on macro and quick terms is greater than spending years reviewing the micro letter.
Salt that doesn’t salt
They are, ultimately, the “seasonings” that pepper the text that allow one to decipher tones and power relations (as if they were needed).
Thus, an analysis of the “verbs” applied to each party allows one to unravel what is written: Argentina “will grant”, “will open”, “will allow”, “will not restrict”, “will not require”, “will gradually eliminate”, “commits to” and “intends to” reform its regulatory framework.
The United States, on the other hand, “may consider”, “will eliminate tariffs on certain products to be defined”, “will cooperate” and “will work jointly”.
