Bulk carrier Ocean Princess (IMO 9245196) struck an oil and gas platform in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast Louisiana last year because of poor bridge resource management
(BRM) and platform not on NOAA charts, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said last week.
The platform was shown on the UK Admiralty paper chart used by the mate on watch, but was not included on the electronic navigation chart provided by NOAA that was displayed on the ship’s ECDIS.
The dry bulk carrier struck the uncrewed and out-of-service oil and gas production platform SP-83A on January 7th 2021 while operating 24 miles south of Pilottown, Louisiana. No pollution or injuries were reported, but damage to the vessel and platform came to an estimated $1.5m.
The NTSB found that the Ocean Princess, with a crew of 24, was drifting overnight in the Gulf of Mexico before heading for New Orleans to load a cargo of grain. The master planned to drift throughout the night with the engine on 15-minute standby, keeping clear of traffic and platforms.
To give the crewmembers some rest after spending the day cleaning cargo holds, the master scheduled himself to be on the bridge with the mate on watch. After engaging the engine to manoeuvre the vessel, the master stated he saw a dim yellow light and checked the radar.
The master and the second officer on watch investigated the light and believed it was coming from an oil platform some five to six miles distant. But only 10 minutes later the Ocean Princess struck platform SP-83A.
The master and second officer told NTSB investigators they never saw SP-83A on the radar. After the contact, both noted that the platform was on the paper chart used on the bridge by the mate on the watch, but SP-83A did not appear on the electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS).
The NTSB found the platform SP-83A was not charted on the official U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) electronic or paper navigation charts that provided the chart data to the ECDIS aboard the Ocean Princess. The platform, however, did appear on the British Admiralty paper chart that the mate on watch was using at the time of the accident.
The NTSB investigation revealed the platform had been shown on the NOAA charts starting in 1990, but for some unknown reason from 2010 it was omitted from two larger-scale US paper charts. It then remained off the two paper charts and electronic navigation charts (ENCs) until after the accident.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the contact of the Ocean Princess with platform SP-83A was poor BRM which resulted in the bridge team not identifying the platform and recognizing the risk it posed to their safe navigation, even though they saw its lights about 10 minutes before the casualty.
A contributing factor was that platform SP-83A was not shown on the vessel’s electronic chart display and information system, due to a charting error.
Following the incident, NOAA updated and corrected the electronic and paper charts that had been erroneously missing platform SP-83A.
NTSB said that “technology, such as an ECDIS, can result in operator overreliance and overconfidence that degrades sound navigation practices and negatively affects situational awareness,” advised NTSB. “When identifying hazards, bridge teams should avoid
overreliance on a single data source.”
2002-built, Hong Kong-flagged, 30,053 gt Ocean Princess is owned by Ocean Princess International care of manager Ocean Longevity Shipping of Hong Kong, China. It is entered with Skuld (Business Unit Skuld Hong Kong) on behalf of Ocean Longevity Shipping & Management Co.
