During the New Year’s Day holiday in 2026, a fire broke out on the vessel “Changyuan You 1” managed by Tangshan Runjurun Ship Service Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Runjurun Company”) while it was sailing. Eight people on board were rescued after being in distress. Recently, the maritime authorities conducted an additional audit on Runjurun Company in accordance with the law and discovered five major hidden dangers in areas such as crew and vessel monitoring and management. The company failed to effectively implement its primary responsibility for enterprise production safety. The maritime authorities have lawfully revoked the company’s Document of Compliance for its Safety Management System.
Runjurun Company failed to conduct pre-job training and assessment for the newly hired captain of the “Changyuan You 1” as required. Runjurun Company’s “Captain’s Shore-based SMS Familiarization Training Record” shows that the newly hired Captain Li was trained on the vessel’s Safety Management System from December 22 to 27, 2025. However, Captain Li was actually serving as the captain on another vessel from December 27 to 28, 2025, and assumed the role of captain on the “Changyuan You 1” on the 28th, the same day he was relieved of his previous duty. Upon verification, Runjurun Company’s “Crew Training Instructions” and “Crew Recruitment Instructions” were not effectively implemented. No training or assessment was conducted for Captain Li, and the training and assessment records were falsified.
Runjurun Company was not aware of key operations such as the vessel’s cargo loading and unloading. Since August 29, 2025, the “Changyuan You 1” had not reported its “Tanker Cargo /Unloading Plan” to Runjurun Company, so the company was unaware of the vessel’s oil product loading and unloading operations. Upon verification, the requirements in Runjurun Company’s “Safety Management Manual” regarding shore-based responsibilities and designated persons were not effectively implemented, resulting in the failure of shore-based safety dynamic monitoring of the vessel.
Runjurun Company was not aware of the actual crew on board. The crew list for the “Changyuan You 1” held by Runjurun Company on January 1, 2026, and the vessel’s port /exit report information on January 2 showed 6 crew members on board. However, there were actually 8 people on board when the fire accident occurred on January 2. Upon verification, the other 2 individuals were arranged to board the vessel separately by the shipowner company. Runjurun Company’s “Crew Management Procedures” were not effectively implemented, leading to the failure of shore-based monitoring and deployment of personnel serving on the vessel.
Runjurun Company lost control over the management of procurement and supply of the vessel’s important spare parts and materials. In July 2025, relevant records indicated that the vessel maintenance supplies and spare parts requested by the “Changyuan You 1” had been supplied to the vessel, but they were not reflected in the quarterly “Vessel Spare Parts Inventory.” Upon verification, the vessel’s spare parts were purchased and supplied by the shipowner company itself. Runjurun Company was not aware of the vessel’s maintenance needs. Its “Vessel Spare Parts and Materials Supply Procedures” were not effectively implemented, resulting in the failure of spare parts and materials management and monitoring.
Runjurun Company failed to promptly provide the vessel’s technical data and drawings during the accident emergency response period. During the emergency response to the “Changyuan You 1” fire accident on January 2, 2026, the company failed to promptly provide the vessel’s technical data and drawings. The “Company Emergency Response Procedures” were not effectively implemented.
Runjurun Company also had multiple other hidden dangers, including failing to implement regular risk and hidden danger self-inspections led by the principal responsible person, failing to strictly review crew qualifications, failing to formulate internal audit plans as required, failing to measure and test facilities and equipment such as boilers, and failing to develop joint ship-shore drill plans. Furthermore, during its major risk and hidden danger investigation and rectification for the 2025 flood season and summer period, the company only identified superficial issues through self-inspection, indicating that the self-inspection of hidden dangers was neither thorough nor substantive.
