For Washington, Cosco’s logistic dominance in the Greek port is perceived as a strategic threat
This is not just simple shipping, but a logistic war fought with billions of euros in infrastructure and geopolitical influence. The start of expansion works for the port of Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki), Greece’s second maritime port, is the most tangible manifestation of this contest. The investment, which amounts to 195 million euros, aims to massively upgrade the container terminal, making it capable of hosting the 24,000 teu Ultra Large Container Vessels (Ulcv), bringing the annual capacity from 650,000 to 1.5 million teu. This transformation, while born from commercial needs, is crucially promoted and supported by the United States, determined to create an alternative hub to the logistic empire that China has built in the Mediterranean.
The context is dominated by the “China factor” and the success of Cosco Shipping, Beijing’s state-owned maritime giant. Since 2016, Cosco has held the absolute majority of the management of the Port of Piraeus (Olp), which under Chinese control has rapidly become the largest in the Mediterranean, a success that has consecrated it as a veritable showcase of the Belt and Road Initiative (Bri). For Washington, however, this logistic dominance is perceived as a strategic threat: the widespread presence of Chinese companies in critical European infrastructure – from ports to 5G systems – is seen as a vulnerability capable of offering Beijing the possibility to exert economic pressure and gain informational advantages.
It is in this scenario of tension that the United States has launched a decisive diplomatic offensive. The primary objective is to foster the development of credible non-Chinese controlled alternatives along the Greek coast. Thessaloniki is the key element of this strategy, destined to function as the “Gateway to the Balkans” for Central Europe, thanks to its position at the intersection of the pan-European corridors IV and X, which connect the Aegean to the markets of Serbia, North Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Romania. American interest has also extended to Alexandroupoli – strategic for NATO supplies – and to the port of Eleusis, proposed as a potential US-Greece joint hub in direct competition with Piraeus.
American pressure has already had concrete repercussions in Europe, where diplomatic interventions blocked the Chinese concession in the Croatian port of Rijeka and prevented Beijing from acquiring the majority of a terminal in the German port of Hamburg. The US strategy in Greece aims to replicate these successes, providing logistic support not only to NATO but also to the new IMEC economic corridor (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), promoted by the G20 and strongly supported by Washington, which explicitly aims to bypass routes dominated by China.
The upgrade of Thessaloniki is, therefore, the weapon that Athens – with Western support – intends to use to rebalance the balance of power in the Aegean, limiting total dependence on the Chinese investor. Despite the opening to the West, the reality in Thessaloniki remains complex: the Port Authority (ThPA) is partly private but has already adopted a container terminal operating system (Ctos) developed by the Chinese group China Merchants Port Holdings Co. (CmPort), a testament to how difficult it is for Greece to extricate itself from the network of investments already established by Beijing. The future of the Eastern Mediterranean and its logistic network hangs on this delicate balance. Athens is called upon to balance the economic benefits derived from massive Chinese investments with the demands for strategic alignment from its NATO allies and EU partners. The expansion of Thessaloniki is the physical manifestation of this global struggle for control of the vital nodes of international trade.
