On October 14, 2025, China will officially impose a “Special Port Fee for Vessels” on US ships and related shipping assets, marking a new phase of escalation in the Sino-US rivalry. Superficially, this is a bilateral port fee game; in essence, it affects the layout of transnational capital, financing structures, and the cost and efficiency of international energy and bulk commodity transportation.
Policy Implementation: Unprecedented Scope of Coverage
Following the announcement issued by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on April 17, 2025, stating that starting October 14, 2025, the US will begin imposing port service fees on maritime services provided by Chinese shipowners and operators, as well as operators using Chinese-built vessels,
On October 10, the Ministry of Transport issued the “Announcement on Collecting Special Port Fees for Vessels from the United States” as a formal countermeasure. The announcement stated that starting October 14, 2025, the Special Port Fee for Vessels will be collected by the maritime management authorities at the ports of call for the following categories: vessels owned by US enterprises, other organizations, and individuals; vessels operated by US enterprises, other organizations, and individuals; vessels owned or operated by enterprises or other organizations in which US enterprises, other organizations, or individuals directly or indirectly hold 25% or more equity (voting rights, board seats); vessels flying the US flag; and vessels built in the United States.
This scope of coverage, from place of registration to equity structure, from place of construction to operating entity, leaves no exception within the policy’s purview. In other words, any vessel in the global shipping market related to US capital or registration will face new cost pressures.
From a policy logic perspective, this is a typical economic hedging tactic of “using ports to counter the US,” applying pressure through port fees to force US-related shipowners to reassess their equity and operational arrangements. The refined design is reflected in the inclusion of enterprises with “direct or indirect shareholding of 25% or more,” targeting capital participation while preventing evasion of supervision through complex equity structures. For US-capital shipowners and investors in the global shipping landscape, this represents direct structural pressure.
Structural Limitations of the US Shipping System
In the landscape of the global shipping market, the presence of the United States is so faint it’s almost imperceptible. Taking the tanker market as an example, the latest data from Ifchor Galbraiths shows that among all operational tankers globally, the number truly built in the US or flying the US flag is extremely small, and mainly concentrated in the small and medium-sized product tanker segment. This structural fact reveals the US role in the shipping industry chain: a capital powerhouse, but not a shipbuilding or fleet powerhouse.
Looking at the chart, statistics based on the “Country of Build” dimension show that the number of in-service global tankers built by US shipyards is minimal—zero for both VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) and Panamax tankers; only 9 in the LR3 category; and only 2 in the LR2 category. The only segment with somewhat notable numbers is the Medium Range (MR 42-60K) product tanker, with 40 vessels built by US shipyards, while other vessel types are virtually absent. In other words, the US shipbuilding industry has long exited the global deep-sea tanker market, maintaining a presence only in coastal and domestic routes.
Analyzing from the “Flag State” perspective reveals a similar trend. Tankers flying the US flag are at very low levels across all major vessel types: zero for VLCC, only 9 for Suezmax, 2 for Aframax, only 1 for LR1, while the MR class remains the mainstay with 55 vessels, with only sporadic presence in others. This means US-flagged vessels are primarily active in domestic coastal transport (the so-called “Jones Act Trade”), with little relation to international routes.
This set of data reveals the structural reality of the US shipping system:
First, the US shipbuilding industry has long shifted to niche areas like military vessels and coastal engineering ships, lacking the industrial capacity to build large ocean-going tankers. The vast majority of global tankers, whether VLCC, Suezmax, or Aframax, are almost entirely sourced from Asian shipyards, particularly China, South Korea, and Japan.
Second, the US merchant fleet still heavily relies on the “flag of convenience” system. Many US-capital shipping companies are nominally US enterprises, but their vessels are registered in the Marshall Islands, Liberia, or Panama to avoid high US registration costs and labor regulations. This makes the US appear statistically as a shipping power, while actual control is dispersed within overseas registry systems.
Third, this structure means the impact of policy adjustments is extremely limited. In other words, whether it’s imposing fees on Chinese or US vessels, or adjusting port policies, the number of US domestic vessels is too small to create a visible impact on supply and demand. Those truly affected are instead the international shipowners who are active in the US market but are controlled by US capital or rely on US financing.
Shipping Companies with Deep US Capital Penetration
A chart compiled by TradeWinds, based on Bloomberg Terminal data, systematically displays the shareholding proportions of US investors in major global shipowners and chartering companies, revealing the profound influence US capital holds in the international shipping landscape.
Overall, the companies in the table cover multiple sectors including tankers, bulk carriers, gas carriers, mining giants, and container shipping, encompassing both traditional shipping companies and bulk commodity mining companies closely related to shipping. The data reflects that US capital generally accounts for a considerable proportion in these companies, even exceeding 80% in some listed shipping enterprises.
Topping the list is Torm, with US investor ownership as high as 90.19%, making it the most “Americanized” shipowning company. Torm is a tanker owner and operator dually listed in Copenhagen and Nasdaq, its largest vessel type being LR1 product tankers, and its major shareholder is US-based Oaktree Capital. This not only highlights the penetration level of US private equity in the tanker sector but also indicates the continued strong preference of US investment institutions for the energy transport segment.
Following closely is Vale US, with US investor ownership at 85.3%. As the US depositary receipt entity for the Brazilian mining giant Vale, its core business is based in Brazil, but its financing and investment structure is highly internationalized, demonstrating the important position of US capital in the global mining and dry bulk shipping chain.
Also in the 80% ownership range are companies like Dorian LPG, Norden, and Nordic American Tankers. These companies are all listed in New York or Copenhagen, primarily engaged in tanker or liquefied gas carrier operations, with their largest vessel types covering VLGC, Capesize bulk carriers, and Suezmax tankers respectively, showing US capital concentrated in segments like medium-to-large vessel types, energy transport, and dry bulk shipping.
US capital shareholding in Scorpio Tankers, ZIM Integrated Shipping Services, and International Seaways also falls between 70%-80%. ZIM, as an Israeli company, has a high proportion of US shareholders due to its listing in New York, reflecting the dominant role of the US capital market in financing the global liner industry.
Besides pure shipping enterprises, the table also lists several large mining groups, such as BHP (51.15%), Anglo American (40.8%), and Rio Tinto (37.9%). While these resource giants focus on mineral extraction as their core business, they are also among the world’s largest dry bulk shipping clients; their US capital background further extends the influence of US capital in the iron ore and coal shipping chains.
Notably, Hong Kong and Greek shipowners like Pacific Basin (50.23%) and Star Bulk (44.75%) also have over forty percent of their shares held by US investors, indicating that even companies not headquartered in the US maintain close linkages with the US market at the capital level.
From an industry structure perspective, US capital is most concentrated in three types of enterprises:
Energy transportation – reflecting dual strategic considerations for energy security and transport returns;
Bulk cargo transportation – closely related to the US role in global mining and trade finance;
Listed financing platform-type companies (e.g., shipping companies listed in New York or Nasdaq) – reflecting the US capital preference for transparent, highly liquid investment targets.
Overall, this chart reveals a clear trend: US investors not only dominate the ownership structure of many major listed shipping companies but also influence the shipping industry’s financing costs, vessel renewal pace, and corporate strategic direction through the capital markets.
Industry insiders believe that the true shockwave of this new regulation, named the “Special Port Fee for Vessels,” lies not merely in the increase in port fees, but in its redefinition of the relationship between capital attributes and shipping sovereignty. For international shipping enterprises, it opens a policy dimension rarely touched before: who owns the vessel, who controls the company, who funded its construction, who decides the operating routes – these financial and legal details will, for the first time, be incorporated into the calculation logic of port costs. This not only alters the financial models of shipowners but may also reshape the entire capital landscape of the international shipping industry.
The direct impact is reflected in costs and route selection. Any vessel related to US capital or US registration – whether tanker, bulk carrier, or container ship – will face additional port expenses when calling at Chinese ports. This fee might seem like just an add-on, but in high-frequency liner services and large bulk transport, its cumulative effect is significant. Especially in a shipping industry where profit margins are already compressed to the limit, an institutional port fee means a substantial marginal cut. For example, if large shipowning groups with US shareholding exceeding 25% do not make structural adjustments, each vessel will bear additional costs for every port call, potentially eroding annual profits by millions of US dollars. In the short term, this will push relevant enterprises to reassess their route networks, with some shipowners potentially opting to bypass Chinese ports and transit through Southeast Asia or Korea to reduce direct exposure to this policy risk.
The long-term impact lies in the rebalancing of capital structures and changes in financing pathways. Currently, among globally publicly listed shipping companies, American capital, whether in the form of funds, private equity, or institutional investors, holds a significant position. This broad and deep capital penetration once served as a crucial support for stable financing in the international shipping market. However, with China explicitly categorizing enterprises with “direct or indirect US shareholding of 25% or more” as targets for levies, this structure has been directly shaken. Shipping companies will be forced to weigh “capital availability” against “policy risk controllability”—some companies may proactively spin off assets, adjust shareholding ratios, or even achieve “de-Americanization” in their legal structures to gain operational convenience in Chinese ports. The extended effect of this trend is the partial fracture and recombination of the global shipping capital chain.
The third layer of impact is the change in market psychology and strategic landscape. For a long time, the shipping industry has been regarded as a typical “globalized industry,” where the flow of capital, ships, and routes transcends political boundaries. However, the introduction of this policy signifies that the geopoliticization of shipping is deepening to the port level. Ports are no longer just service endpoints or logistics nodes but have become the front line in the game between national policies and international capital. For shipping companies, the rise in this “geopolitical port cost” will prompt them to re-evaluate the balance between supply chain security and costs globally:
On one hand, the attractiveness of Chinese ports to global cargo flows remains strong, especially in the dry bulk, energy transportation, and manufacturing export sectors, where they hold an irreplaceable position. On the other hand, if political and capital pressures compound, some enterprises may accelerate investment in alternative ports in Southeast Asia, South Asia, or the Middle East, which will indirectly promote the redistribution of regional shipping networks.
Finally, and most profoundly, is the awakening of shipping sovereignty consciousness. Through this policy, China has sent a clear signal in the international shipping governance system: port sovereignty is not only reflected in administrative jurisdiction and navigation safety but also extends to the distribution of economic benefits and the control of capital influence. This will have long-term effects on the future of international shipping rules. In the past, the international shipping industry was based on open markets and free calls. However, against the backdrop of prolonged Sino-US strategic competition, the bundling of “port cost—capital structure—national identity” may become a new regulatory norm. This also means that future shipping companies must possess stronger geopolitical sensitivity at the operational level, not only calculating fuel costs and insurance premiums but also assessing the policy risks brought by “capital identity.”
In fact, the impact of the new policy on the shipping market has already materialized. Following China’s announcement of port fees for US-flagged vessels, a number of tankers and bulk commodity carriers originally bound for China were canceled, triggering chain reactions in the global energy and dry bulk shipping markets.
According to several industry insiders familiar with the market situation, on Friday, several bookings for tankers scheduled to deliver crude oil to Chinese ports were canceled last minute. This change occurred after China announced the fees for US-flagged vessels. Meanwhile, freight rates for dry bulk carriers transporting coal and iron ore also rose rapidly, reflecting market concerns about rising transportation costs.
According to relevant calculations, a large supertanker may need to pay an additional fee of approximately $6.2 million per port call. For Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) capable of loading about 2 million barrels of crude oil, this policy almost directly increases the operating costs of long-haul transportation.
Analysts at Fearnley Securities pointed out: “The immediate impact of this policy is quite significant. Given the substantial amounts involved, market efficiency is expected to be disrupted, and freight rates may also be pushed higher.”
Stimulated by the news, the shipping derivatives market strengthened again. According to market sources, since Thursday, freight derivative contract prices for the Middle East to China route have accumulated an increase of nearly 25%. Prior to this, the US had just imposed sanctions on a large Chinese crude oil terminal, causing tanker market yields to already show an upward trend.
Analysts at Jefferies noted: “China’s new fee framework has far-reaching implications, particularly for shipping companies listed in the US with more than 25% ownership by US domestic investment funds, where the potential impact will be very apparent.”
Shipping Psychological Game: The Dilemma of Shipowners and Financial Leasing Companies
For shipowners and financial leasing companies, the psychological pressure brought by this Sino-US port fee game is unprecedented. In the past, risks in the shipping industry were mainly concentrated on market freight rate fluctuations, fuel costs, and geopolitical emergencies. Now, the capital attribute itself has become a potential source of policy risk—every financing deal, every port call could affect financial and strategic decisions.
The psychological pressure faced by shipping companies calling at US ports has extended from traditional market risks to policy risks. Even if only a few Chinese leasing companies participate in a vessel’s financing structure, the shipowner might be identified as a “Chinese vessel,” facing high port fees or potential financing restrictions. This “invisible risk” fills daily operations with uncertainty—every port call could trigger fiscal costs, forcing shipping decision-makers to calculate the possibility of policy exposure in addition to market operations.
Meanwhile, the psychology of shipowners subject to Chinese port fees is equally complex. As the Chinese policy officially takes effect from October 2025, some international shipping companies with US backgrounds calling at Chinese ports are finding that their previous cost advantages are rapidly being eroded by policy costs. This psychological pressure manifests as “income insecurity.”
A deeper psychological pressure stems from the uncertainty of the financing chain. Chinese leasing companies have played a central role in global shipping finance over the past decade, providing low-cost, high-leverage sale-leaseback and structured financing solutions. Shipowners and financial teams are now caught in a dilemma: they want to retain the advantage of low-cost financing but worry that policy penalties could instantly undermine this advantage. Financial leasing companies, meanwhile, must not only assess the future cash flow of assets but also find a balance between customer relationships, asset restructuring, and cross-border compliance. Every financing decision is not just a financial choice but also a trade-off involving strategic and legal risks.
The vague definition regarding which shipowners are subject to the port fees further intensifies psychological tension. The Sino-US policy texts do not clearly specify the detailed identification process, forcing shipping companies to individually review financing agreements, ownership structures, and board arrangements, and proactively seek non-Chinese financing channels to avoid potential exposure. This cautious psychology is spreading rapidly within the industry, forcing financing activities that originally followed market logic into a policy compliance calculation framework. Many shipowners describe the current state as “confusing and passive,” even showing a tendency to “prefer paying more interest to avoid policy risk.”
The psychological complexity is also reflected in global shipping strategic adjustments. To avoid high port fees, some shipowners are adjusting vessel calls, headquarters registration locations, and financing structures, for example, moving headquarters from Hong Kong to Singapore or registering vessels under non-sensitive flag states; some Chinese leasing institutions are attempting to transfer assets into Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to reduce potential policy exposure. However, if policy standards are adjusted or expanded, past maneuvers could become instantly ineffective.
From the perspective of the maritime circle, in this Sino-US game “bounded by ports,” shipping companies are forced to reconsider a most fundamental question: in the name of globalization, who truly owns a ship?
The flow of capital, the source of financing, and the distribution of equity are being redefined as the “implicit nationality” of geopolitics. The global balance maintained by the shipping industry over the past decade through transnational capital and free ports is now being recalibrated. For shipowners, policy risk and market volatility are increasingly difficult to distinguish; for financial institutions, the boundary between the freedom of capital flow and compliance review is becoming increasingly blurred.
It is foreseeable that the future shipping world will no longer be purely about market competition but a dynamic balance of three forces: ports, capital, and policy. On this redrawn maritime chessboard, ports are not just endpoints but extensions of national power, coordinates of capital, and outposts of rules.
