On a planetary level, the numbers updated to 2025 are bleak and reflect a worrying plateau.
The rhetoric of the energy transition clashes with a brutal reality, measured by the cold arithmetic of the climate: the elimination of coal from the global electricity generation mix must accelerate at a speed ten times greater than the current one to keep the crucial goal of the Paris Agreement alive, that is to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees centigrade. The analysis is a wake-up call that tears the veil of optimism from many climate summits. A structural and profound misalignment is noted between the political commitments undertaken with great pomp and the inertial and persistent dynamics of the fossil energy sector. The scientific community is unanimous: to avoid the most catastrophic effects of climate change, it is no longer enough to slow down; a sudden and total shift is required, a veritable industrial revolution in reverse, which dismantles in a decade what was built over two centuries.
On a planetary level, the numbers updated to 2025 are bleak and reflect a worrying plateau. According to analyses by the International Energy Agency (IEA), after reaching a new record in 2024, global coal demand is expected to remain substantially stable in 2025, confirming itself near the historical highs, estimated at around 8.8 billion tonnes. Despite signs of a slowdown in some regions, the underlying trajectory of global consumption remains flat. Coal still represents about 35% of global electricity generation in 2025. This stability hides contrasting regional dynamics: in China, demand is expected to fall slightly, by less than 1% for the entire year, partly thanks to the enormous expansion of renewables. In the same period, in the United States, growth of 7% is predicted, also driven by rising natural gas prices, while in the European Union a decline of around 2% is estimated. The apparent stability of 2025 translates to an inability to initiate a decisive and structural contraction, postponing the slight decline to 2026.
The People’s Republic of China is the main driver of this demand, consuming almost 30% more coal than the rest of the world combined, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole covers 77% of global demand (2024 data).
An honest analysis requires recognizing that the increase in Chinese consumption is partially functional to the production of innumerable consumer and capital goods destined primarily for OECD countries. The West, while having in many cases reduced the direct use of coal on its own soil, implicitly imports enormous quantities of carbon through its domestic footprint, hidden behind the “Made in China” label. A form of climate outsourcing is taking shape, which allows rich countries to boast cleaner territorial emission statistics, transferring the environmental cost elsewhere. Fossil gas, often presented as a “transition” energy to lighten the load of coal, risks in turn becoming a costly and lasting dead end, further slowing the conversion to zero-emission sources.
The paradox grows larger when considering the global pipeline of new thermoelectric power plants. While climate science demands the early closure of existing plants and the immediate halt of all new construction, construction activity does not stop.
In 2023, the global coal capacity under development increased, driven by China, where the overall capacity is 260 GW higher than in 2015. This net expansion is a glaring indicator of how much business as usual prevails over ecological imperatives.
Coal, with bitter evidence, is far from being a relic of the past; it is a currency in current use, even expanding, in the global energy economy, a choice motivated by low initial costs and the availability of the fuel.
The commitments made at the national level, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) presented under the Agreement, are patently insufficient in their entirety. If every nation fully and timely honored its targets, the result would not be the containment to 1.5°C, but a much more dangerous warming trajectory, estimated at around 1.7°C. This level entails much more severe and costly climate impacts, in terms of extreme weather events and the physical security of the energy infrastructures themselves. The gap between the ambition declared at global conferences and the real political will to implement stringent and immediate internal measures remains abysmal.
In Europe, despite recording progress, the picture remains uneven and incomplete. While countries like Sweden, Austria, or Belgium have already eliminated the most polluting fossil fuel from their mix, nations crucial for the continent like Germany aim for a complete transition by 2040, while Poland, historically and structurally dependent on mines, had set the initial target for 2049, although internal political discussions are pushing for an earlier date. The French national goal of shutting down its last four plants by 2022 is an example of decisive action at the micro level, isolated and insufficient to balance the global macro-trend of expansion.
The real stake is not the technical feasibility of the transition, but the ability of the international economic and political system to digest a radical change in compressed timeframes. It is about managing the accelerated collapse of a century-old industry, with all its social and economic implications, especially in regions and developing countries where coal still represents a source of jobs and low-cost energy security. The core issue is not primarily technological, but one of global governance and equity. The international community must move from a logic of voluntary and non-binding promises to a regime of imposition and stringent cooperation on de-carbonization. The time window for decisive action is closing rapidly, hinting at a future where the Paris goal will be nullified by our inertia.
It must be admitted: the current stagnation is a political failure of historic proportions.
