The context of this migration of trust is polarized by the geopolitical factor, as stated in recent days by the Deputy Minister of Transport Edoardo Rixi at the “Shipping Forum” organized by Secolo XIX in Genoa.
Beijing – The destiny of global routes and strategic alliances is now being written in shipyards and at the negotiating tables of international finance. The announcement by the French giant CMA CGM that it wants to commission six new LNG-powered container ships from the Indian Cochin Shipyard Limited marks much more than a simple high-profile commercial agreement: it is the most recent and tangible indicator of a profound geoeconomic reorientation of Europe, which is progressively shifting its strategic gaze and investments from China to India. Although the global shipbuilding market is still dominated, in terms of volume and technology, by China and South Korea, this pioneering move makes CMA CGM the first international operator to invest in an Indian shipyard for LNG-powered ships, and it fits with surgical precision into the “de-risking” and supply chain diversification strategy promoted by Brussels.
The context of this migration of trust is polarized by the geopolitical factor, as stated in recent days by the Deputy Minister of Transport Edoardo Rixi at the “Shipping Forum” organized by Secolo XIX in Genoa.
China, long considered the “world’s factory” and an indispensable economic partner, is now viewed by Europe through the prism of systemic risk, a change in perception matured under the pressure of two concomitant and critical factors. The first, and most pressing, is undoubtedly the strengthening of the Beijing-Moscow axis. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, the “no-limits strategic partnership” between China and Russia has become a destabilizing element in Sino-European relations. Despite Beijing’s attempts to present itself as neutral, economic reality highlights a growing cooperation that, in fact, undermines the effectiveness of the Western sanctions regime. China has become Russia’s main trading partner, providing indirect economic support and, crucially, dual-use goods, essential for the Russian war machine. This alignment, described by Russian President Vladimir Putin as “at an unprecedented level,” has strengthened in the European Union the conviction, already widespread in Italy, that deep economic dependence on China entails an existential security risk, undermining the strategic coherence of the bloc. The thesis, supported by several analysts, is that the structural closeness between the two autocracies is now too tight to allow Europe a relationship with China based on pure economic neutrality, making the intensification and acceleration of European action almost existentially important for its strategic autonomy.
The second factor of distancing is the direct experience of how limited the guarantees of reciprocity and transparency are in Chinese investments in Europe, particularly in Italy. Italy, in particular, had signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019, opening the door to Chinese ambitions for strategic ports. The expectations of massive investments in the crucial ports of Genoa and Trieste, vital hubs for the Mediterranean and Central Europe, have been largely disappointed.
On the contrary, attempts by the Chinese state-owned giant COSCO to acquire controlling or significant stakes in terminals have been systematically rejected or limited thanks to national scrutiny, through the activation of the Golden Power procedure. Chinese penetration in Italian ports has so far remained “very limited,” concentrating on marginal or minority investments, such as in the Savona-Vado Ligure terminal. Nor has the pre-pandemic announcement about potential agreements for the terminals of Genoa and Trieste been followed up.
This failure is not an isolated case, but reflects the growing concern at the community level about the risks of dependency (including cyber risks and the potential collection of sensitive data by Chinese technologies) generated by the pervasiveness of the Eastern giant in European maritime infrastructure. The episode, combined with the growing commercial tension over the issues of Chinese industrial overcapacity and the resulting anti-subsidy investigations launched by the EU, for example in the electric vehicle sector, has made Chinese reliability an excessively costly unknown.
In the face of a partner perceived as increasingly risky and assertive, India emerges as the strategic and, above all, economic antithesis. The commercial relationship between the European Union and India, while not yet matching the volumes with China, is growing rapidly and is based on foundations perceived as more solid and less conflictual, thanks to the common democratic denominator. Economic data is eloquent about the direction Europe is taking: in the last Indian fiscal year (2023-24, ended March 2024), merchandise trade between the EU and India reached about $137.41 billion, accompanied by robust trade in services of $51.45 billion. Indian exports to the EU amounted to $62.28 billion, and imports to $75.13 billion in the same period. Although India currently holds only 1% of the global shipbuilding market, its growth potential is exponential and supported by a clear strategic vision. Government initiatives such as “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) are a clear invitation to European companies to relocate or diversify production in a market that, with a population that has surpassed China’s, offers a massive and ever-expanding consumer base and workforce.
India’s attractiveness lies not only in current figures, but in its GDP growth rate, consistently among the highest in the world, and in the composition of its trade with the EU.
European exports to India are concentrated in high-value-added sectors of mutual interest: Europe exports to India mainly machinery (over 34.8% of the total), transport equipment (15.1%), and chemicals (12.2%), goods that fuel Indian industrial growth and which, at the same time, guarantee Europe a crucial diversification for the resilience of its supply chains. India’s goal of entering the world’s top-five in shipbuilding by 2047, supported by an investment plan of nearly $8 billion, as highlighted by the Cma Cgm agreement for 1,700 teu gas-powered ships, shows that New Delhi is ready to climb the technological and productive ladder, offering a concrete alternative to Asian dependency.
The partnership with India is not only a choice of economic diversification, but a geopolitical move that aligns Europe with an emerging power with which it fundamentally shares the values of multilateralism and democracy.
