What does Thursday’s attack on the Ever Lovely tell us about current approaches to transiting the Straits of Hormuz?

0
4

by Robin Russel, CEO SATVA TRUST for allaboutshipping.co.uk

Mr Arsenio Domingez, the IMO Secretary General, held a press briefing yesterday covering the IMO-led evacuation framework that has been paused after the Ever Lovely was struck by a drone as it transited the Strait of Hormuz on the way out of the Persian Gulf on Thursday.

Mr Dominguez focused his opening comments on the continued plight of the 11,000 seafarers still trapped and in danger within the Persian Gulf. Within the wider story of the US war of choice and its global economic impacts, it’s easy to forget that these seafarers are not party to the conflict – yet suffer its effects directly.

In March the IMO Council’s special session mandated a humanitarian corridor to evacuate stranded ships and seafarers from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Under the evacuation plan, vessels are prioritised and grouped based on time stranded, location and need, contacted by the IMO as their turn approaches. Following a full risk assessment, they are staged in a holding area before sharing their sailing plan with Iran and Oman to ensure safe navigation. 115 ships have transited using the IMO’s evacuation framework in the 3.5 days between its launch and the pause, leaving about 500 still trapped.

The IMO’s evacuation plan works because of its multilateral nature: explicit guarantees of safe passage the IMO has secured from all parties concerned, including Iran, the US and Oman. This has been the result of several months of intense communication and coordination by Mr Dominguez and his team, supported by the UK, France and some Gulf states. With a welcome core focus on seafarer safety, the pause is being used to reconfirm those guarantees of safe passage for vessels transiting under the framework.

This seems to me the IMO at its best.

There are currently two routes through the Straits of Hormuz. To the north, within Iranian territorial waters, presumably used by those ships that have good reason to feel safe from Iran’s aggression. To the south, within Omani territorial waters, used by the IMO’s evacuation framework and other ships not waiting for their turn in that process. The route used since 1968, under the Traffic Segregation Scheme, is not currently usable since it was mined by Iran during the conflict. Mr Dominguez shared an estimate of 80 mines, with clearing the route one of topics under discussion as part of the US/Iran Memorandum of Understanding signed last week.

The Ever Lovely was transiting separately to the evacuation plan, relying on the US and Omani recommendation to use the south route and their facilitation of that route as a risk-mitigation choice – although without any guarantee of safety. My understanding is that that US naval assets monitor the route and, where possible, deter attacks. It seems that the risk mitigation is an assumption that attacks on ships using this corridor will likely trigger retaliation – an assumption validated by today’s air strikes by the US on Iran military targets, which they explicitly linked to the Ever Lovely attack.

The theory is that this stick wielding makes an attack less likely in the first place. How robust this theory proves remains to be seen, given Iran’s repeated statements disavowing “unauthorised routes” and their actions during the war, but in any case it’s very disappointing to see seafarers put in increased danger to test it.

One transit option carries the safety of navigation explicitly guaranteed by all parties.

The second carries a promise from one of the warring parties to hit back if there’s an attack. I know which option I would choose.

About 33 ships per day were transiting the IMO’s evacuation framework up until Thursday afternoon. In a world in which it restarts, that means 15 days to for all the remaining 500 ships stranded in the Persian Gulf to transit out. Why choose to transit outside the IMO’s evacuation framework? Presumably impatience – the draw of those days’ revenue evaporating as you wait for the IMO’s call that it’s your turn.

It’s the seafarers on board who bear the risk of a decision to move faster outside the evacuation framework. How do owners weigh up this decision? No vessel will sail without the nod from its insurers: what data are they using to approve the risk?

What price the life of a seafarer?